Results of a study investigating the relation between personality traits and ethical-orientation indicate sex is not an good predictor for differences in Machiavellian-, Type A personality- or ethical-orientation. Intelligence is found to be positively associated with Machiavellian- and Type A personality-orientation but negatively associated with ethical-orientation. Machiavellians tend to have Type A personalities, but tend to be less ethically-oriented than Nonmachiavellians. Type A personalities are more ethically-orientated than Type B personalities.

This paper explores allowing truth value assignments to be undetermined or "partial" and overdetermined or "inconsistent", thus returning to an investigation of the four-valued semantics that I initiated in the sixties. I examine some natural consequence relations and show how they are related to existing logics, including ukasiewicz's three-valued logic, Kleene's three-valued logic, Anderson and Belnap's relevant entailments, Priest's "Logic of Paradox", and the first-degree fragment of the Dunn-McCall system "R-mingle". None of these systems have nested implications, and I investigate (...) twelve natural extensions containing nested implications, all of which can be viewed as coming from natural variations on Kripke's semantics for intuitionistic logic. Many of these logics exist antecedently in the literature, in particular Nelson 's "constructible falsity". (shrink)

This comprehensive text shows how various notions of logic can be viewed as notions of universal algebra providing more advanced concepts for those who have an introductory knowledge of algebraic logic, as well as those wishing to delve into more theoretical aspects.

This volume includes three previously untranslated transcripts of Kant's logic lectures.

In spite of a powerful tradition, more than two thousand years old, that in a valid argument the premises must be relevant to the conclusion, twentieth-century logicians neglected the concept of relevance until the publication of Volume I of this monumental work. Since that time relevance logic has achieved an important place in the field of philosophy: Volume II of Entailment brings to a conclusion a powerful and authoritative presentation of the subject by most of the top people working in (...) the area. Originally the aim of Volume II was simply to cover certain topics not treated in the first volume--quantification, for example--or to extend the coverage of certain topics, such as semantics. However, because of the technical progress that has occurred since the publication of the first volume, Volume II now includes other material. The book contains the work of Alasdair Urquhart, who has shown that the principal sentential systems of relevance logic are undecidable, and of Kit Fine, who has demonstrated that, although the first-order systems are incomplete with respect to the conjectured constant domain semantics, they are still complete with respect to a semantics based on "arbitrary objects." Also presented is important work by the other contributing authors, who are Daniel Cohen, Steven Giambrone, Dorothy L. Grover, Anil Gupta, Glen Helman, Errol P. Martin, Michael A. McRobbie, and Stuart Shapiro. Robert G. Wolf's bibliography of 3000 items is a valuable addition to the volume. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

We give a set of postulates for the minimal normal modal logicK + without negation or any kind of implication. The connectives are simply , , , . The postulates (and theorems) are all deducibility statements . The only postulates that might not be obvious are.

We study an application of gaggle theory to unary negative modal operators. First we treat negation as impossibility and get a minimal logic system Ki that has a perp semantics. Dunn 's kite of different negations can be dealt with in the extensions of this basic logic Ki. Next we treat negation as “unnecessity” and use a characteristic semantics for different negations in a kite which is dual to Dunn 's original one. Ku is the minimal logic that has a (...) characteristic semantics. We also show that Shramko's falsification logic FL can be incorporated into some extension of this basic logic Ku. Finally, we unite the two basic logics Ki and Ku together to get a negative modal logic K-, which is dual to the positive modal logic K+ in [7]. Shramko has suggested an extension of Dunn 's kite and also a dual version in [12]. He also suggested combining them into a “united” kite. We give a united semantics for this united kite of negations. (shrink)

Gangestad & Simpson's theory accounts for the existence of male strategic variation admirably well, although it does not specify the precise nature of the adaptation linking male developmental stability to strategic pluralism. In contrast, female strategic variation remains elusive. Empirical data suggest that genetic variation partly underlies such variation, but the causes of female strategic differences largely remain unexplained.

Arnon Avron has written: “Dunn-McCall logic RM is by far the best understood and the most well-behaved in the family of logics developed by the school of Anderson and Belnap.” I agree. There is the famous saying: “Do not let the perfect become the enemy of the good.” I might say: “good enough.” In this spirit, I will examine the logic R-Mingle, exploring how it is only a “semi-relevant logic” but still a paraconsistent logic. I shall discuss the history of (...) RM, and compare RM to Anderson and Belnap’s system R of relevant implication and to classical two-valued logic. There is a “consumer’s guide,” evaluating these logics as “tools,” in the light of my recent work on “Humans as Rational Toolmaking Animals.”. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce canonical extensions of partially ordered sets and monotone maps and a corresponding discrete duality. We then use these to give a uniform treatment of completeness of relational semantics for various substructural logics with implication as the residual(s) of fusion.

Sexual size dimorphism is generally associated with sexual selection via agonistic male competition in nonhuman primates. These primate models play an important role in understanding the origins and evolution of human behavior. Human size dimorphism is often hypothesized to be associated with high rates of male violence and polygyny. This raises the question of whether human dimorphism and patterns of male violence are inherited from a common ancestor with chimpanzees or are uniquely derived. Here I review patterns of, and causal (...) models for, dimorphism in humans and other primates. While dimorphism in primates is associated with agonistic male mate competition, a variety of factors can affect male and female size, and thereby dimorphism. The causes of human sexual size dimorphism are uncertain, and could involve several non-mutually-exclusive mechanisms, such as mate competition, resource competition, intergroup violence, and female choice. A phylogenetic reconstruction of the evolution of dimorphism, including fossil hominins, indicates that the modern human condition is derived. This suggests that at least some behavioral similarities with Pan associated with dimorphism may have arisen independently, and not directly from a common ancestor. (shrink)

Multiple concepts of nature are at play in environmental theory and practice. One that has gripped several theorists is the idea of nature as referring to that which is independent of humans and human activity. This concept has been subject to forceful criticism, notably in the recent work of Steven Vogel. After clarifying problematic and promising ways of charac­terizing independent nature, I engage Vogel’s critique. While the critique is compelling in certain respects, I argue that it fails to appreciate what (...) I take to be an important motivating concern of those drawn to the concept of independent nature, or something like it. I offer a characterization of that concern—a worry about problematic instrumentalization of the nonhuman world—and suggest why this concern, and the idea of independent nature which helps to make it intelligible, should continue to inform environmental theory and practice. In offering a qualified defense of the concept of independent nature, and of its value, I assume that such a concept is only one possible tool in a multi-pronged approach to environmental theorizing, deliberation, action, and policy. (shrink)

John O’Neill, Alan Holland, and Andrew Light usefully distinguish two ways of thinking about environmental values, namely, end-state and historical views. To value nature in an end-state way is to value it because it instantiates certain properties, such as complexity or diversity. In contrast, a historical view says that nature’s value is (partly) determined by its particular history. Three contemporary defenses of a historical view are explored in order to clarify: (1) the normatively relevant history; (2) how historical considerations are (...) supposed to instruct environmental decision making; and (3) the relative importance of historical and end-state considerations. There are multiple reasons for including historical considerations in an account of environmental values. For example, knowledge of a natural object’s history can add depth and texture to our appreciation of that object. Further, if we were blind to the relevant history, we could not adequately understand and defend environmental policy goals such as preserving the potentials of natural systems or maintaining ecological health, for these goals appear to have irreducibly historical aspects. While historical considerations are important, such considerations are insufficient to guide our normative thinking about nature and how it should be dealt with practically. But they succeed in broadening and deepening our understanding of the nature and sources of environmental value. (shrink)

Die Reedition der von den Verfassern nunmehr Excerpta Vaticana et Laurentiana genannt wird, findet ihre Begründung darin, dass der Erstherausgeber, der berühmt Rechtshistoriker Contardo Ferrini offenbar auf eine Kollationierung beider Codices verzichtet hat und im Übrigen, aus welchen Gründen auch immer, bei der Edition selbst nicht unwesentliche Versehen verschuldet hat. Der Codex Vaticanus Palatinus ist wohl in der ersten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts entstanden, der Codex Laurentianus 80.6 in der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts. Grundsätzlich sind die Verfasser der Meinung, (...) die mit zahlreichen plausiblen Argumenten vorgetragen wird, dass der Schreiber des Codex Laurentianus 80.6, ein gewisser Stephanus of Medea, als Vorlage den heutigen Codex Vaticanus Gr. 19 vor sich liegen hatte, und als intelligenter Kopist verschiedene Emendationen vorgenommen hat. Eine große Mehrheit der Fragmente der Excerpta Vaticana et Laurentiana von 1–193 muss einem Juristen Anatolius zugeschrieben werden. Jene Person, die sie zusammengestellt hat, muss ein altes Manuskript mit der Summa Codicis des Anatolius verwendet haben. In dieser Summa waren die Termini technici immer noch in lateinischer Sprache verfasst. Zur Selektion der Texte führen die Verfasser an, dass überdurchschnittlich großes Interesse dem Strafrecht und dem Familienrecht gewidmet ist, während etwa Eigentumserwerb, Erbrecht und große Teile des Obligationenrechtes kaum Behandlung finden. Die Exzerpierung der Summa Codicis muss aus diesem Grunde von jemand vorgenommen worden sein, der eine besondere Affinität gerade zu diesen Bereichen des Rechtes hatte. Nach diesen grundsätzlichen und grundlegenden Ausführungen, die ich allesamt nicht nur begrüße, sondern voll mittragen möchte, widmen sich die Verfasser kurz aber prägnant der Person des Anatolius (24–30). Ein Anatolius wird zusammen mit sieben anderen Antecessores in der Constitutio Omne genannt, sowie in der Constitutio Tanta vom 16. Dezember 533 als einer der vier Professoren, denen die Kompilation der Digesten anvertraut worden war. Er bekleidete die Funktion eines Magister Officiorum und wurde aus diesem Grunde als Vir Illustris bezeichnet. Anatolius entstammte einer Juristenfamilie aus Beirut und lehrte dort selbst als Professor. Zachariae von Lingenthal (Griechische Bearbeitung des Codex 70) und Van der Waal (Comentar 111) hatten die Ansicht vertreten, dass es zwei Anatoli gegeben habe: Der eine Mitglied der justinianischen Kompilation, der andere der Autor des Codex-Kommentares. Dem gegenüber vertreten die Autoren die Ansicht, dass Anatolius ein einziger gewesen sei, der, nachdem er maßgeblich an der Kompilation in Konstantinopel mitgearbeitet hatte, etwa zwischen 530 und 533 als Lehrer nach Beirut zurückgekehrt sei, um dort an einer der prestigeträchtigsten Universitäten des Reiches die neue juristische Studienordnung durchzusetzen und ruhmreich zu begründen. Der Kommentar des Codex diente dazu, einen grundsätzlichen lateinischen Text griechischen Studenten zu verdeutlichen, und zwar ausgehend von einer reinen Übersetzung bis zu einem juristischen Kommentar. Die Autoren lösen die Quellenproblematik derart, dass sie davon ausgehen, dass Anatolius das Buch 4 seines Kommentares noch in Konstantinopel vollendet und mit dem 8. Buch des Kommentares in Beirut wieder begonnen hat. Die klare und deutliche Argumentationsweise der Autoren, unpolemisch aber doch tiefgreifend, sollte in Zukunft übernommen werden. (shrink)

Given classical (2 valued) structures and and a homomorphism h of onto , it is shown how to construct a (non-degenerate) 3-valued counterpart of . Classical sentences that are true in are non-false in . Applications to number theory and type theory (with axiom of infinity) produce finite 3-valued models in which all classically true sentences of these theories are non-false. Connections to relevant logic give absolute consistency proofs for versions of these theories formulated in relevant logic (the proof for (...) number theory was obtained earlier by R. K. Meyer and suggested the present abstract development). (shrink)

An environmental ethic needs to have an answer to two basic questions: what nature should we care about, and why? A number of proposals have been made about how to answer these questions. In this paper, I consider in detail one such proposal, namely, biological or ecological integrity. Different characterizations of integrity can be found in the literature, but I will treat the following one as paradigmatic. Integrity refers to a property of landscapes that are relatively unmodified by human activity (...) and that have their native biota largely intact.1 By “native biota,” I mean the native plant and animal life in a particular place, and... (shrink)

In this paper we introduce canonical extensions of partially ordered sets and monotone maps and a corresponding discrete duality. We then use these to give a uniform treatment of completeness of relational semantics for various substructural logics with implication as the residual(s) of fusion.

Kant's views on logic and logical theory play an important part in his critical writings, especially the Critique of Pure Reason. However, since he published only one short essay on the subject, we must turn to texts derived from his logic lectures to understand his views. This volume includes three previously untranslated transcripts of Kant's logic lectures: the Blomberg Logic, the Vienna Logic supplemented by the recently discovered Hechsel Logic, and the Dohna-Wundlacken Logic. Also included is a new translation of (...) the Jäsche Logic, compiled at Kant's request from his lectures and published in 1800, and concordances relating Kant's lectures to Georg Friedrich Meier's Excerpts from the Doctrine of Reason, the book on which Kant lectured throughout his life and in which he left extensive notes. (shrink)

Anselm's argument has two distinct conclusions: (a) we cannot intelligibly doubt that god exists, and (b) this god, whose existence we cannot doubt, exists necessarily. if we replace anselm's vague conception of god by the spinozistic conception of substance, a defensible version of the ontological argument, understood as having these two conclusions, can be constructed. two important consequences of this analysis are: (1) the ontological argument, properly understood, deals simply with the concept of substance. it is a further question whether (...) substance ought to be understood as god. (2) the ontological argument does not actually demonstrate the existence of anything. it simply makes clear the consequences of adopting a metaphysical view which employs the spinozistic conception of substance. (shrink)